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This paper discusses the implementation of an online 
voting system based on image steganography and vi-
sual cryptography. The system was implemented in 
Java EE on a web-based interface, with MySQL da-
tabase server and Glassfish application server as the 
backend. After considering the requirements of an on-
line voting system, curent technologies on electronic 
voting schemes in published literature were examined. 
Next, the cryptographic and steganography techniques 
best suited for the requirements of the voting system 
were chosen, and the software was implemented. We 
have incorporated in our system techniques like the 
password hashed based scheme, visual cryptography, 
F5 image steganography and threshold decryption 
cryptosystem. The analysis, design and implementa-
tion phase of the software development of the voting 
system is discussed in detail. We have also used a 
questionnaire survey and did the user acceptance test-
ing of the system.
ACM CCS (2012) Classification: Security and privacy → Security services → Authentication → Graphical / visual passwords
Security and privacy → Security services → Access 
control
Keywords: electronic voting system; image stegano- 
graphy; visual cryptography; user acceptance testing
1. Introduction
Many people nowadays prefer a faster and 
more secure way to vote. A traditional election 
procedure does not meet voters' demands any-
more. This might lead to a low turnout in an 
election. With the rapid growth of computer 
technology, many researchers are proposing se-
cure, reliable, and convenient electronic voting 
systems as a substitute to the traditional voting 
procedure. Compared to the traditional voting 
system, the new system could ofer shorter time 
in finishing the main operations in the election 
progress, such as vote casting, authentication, 
registration and vote talying processes. In a 
traditional voting procedure, al these processes 
would be divided into few stages at few difer-
ent stations. Implementation of the electronic 
voting system could help the election oficials 
who administer the election and minimise the 
cost of the election itself. If an electronic voting 
system is designed properly, it can also provide 
a more secure system than the paper-based elec-
tion by providing precise data communication 
and preventing threats and atacks by intruders. 
In recent years, researchers are focusing more 
on developing new technologies that can pre-
vent coercion, provide receipts to ensure voter-
verifiability and ofer universal-verifiability 
through the implementation of the buletin 
board. These three aspects are the vital compo-
nents of a reliable election procedure. The vot-
ing systems with such characteristics are cate-
gorised as end-to-end verifiable voting systems 
(E2E). Many E2E systems have been proposed 
and are widely used nowadays [1] – [7]. In prin-
ciple, an E2E voting system ofers assurance to 
the voters by distributing a receipt of their vote 
after they have cast their votes, which can be 
used for verification purpose from the overal 
tabulation of the colected votes. This receipt 
could not be used as a proof of vote buying or 
coercion, but al of those encrypted receipts 
wil be posted publicly in a read-only Buletin 
Board after each voter finishes the voting pro-
cess. Thus, the E2E system could stil protect the 
voter's privacy and ensure election's integrity. 
The proposed E2E voting system in this work 
is based on the earlier design concepts, but dif-
fers from the previous work because of the im-
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plementation of two distinct schemes. They are 
cryptography and steganography. Both compo-
nents of information security are combined in 
a layer of data protection. In electronic voting, 
cryptography is a commonly used technique as 
it is a good defence against threats. However, 
steganography has not been used commonly 
as an additional layer of security in an online 
voting system. The combination of these two 
schemes is the novel approach proposed in this 
work, mainly implemented to secure the com-
munication between the user and the server. It 
is expected to produce an improved technique, 
which could meet the voter's demand and per-
form with a less performance cost in a secure 
manner.
To ensure the integrity of an election, many 
schemes have been implemented and proposed. 
In these schemes, cryptography is used to pro-
tect the data transmited between the voter and 
the server, to ensure that it would not be leaked 
to a third party. The cryptography techniques 
are also applied in each process in the system 
to ensure the authenticity of the voter, the origi-
nality of the balots cast and colected votes, the 
reliability of the talied votes and the privacy 
throughout the election. There are many cryp-
tography methods that can be applied, such as 
blind signature scheme, homomorphic encryp-
tion, oblivious signature scheme, bit commit-
ment scheme, Schnor identification scheme, 
mixed-net schemes, digital signature scheme, 
secure multi-party computation, cryptographic 
hash-function, etc. However, in this work, only 
a few selected schemes are used. These are ap-
plied in diferent voting stages to preserve the 
main characteristics of an electronic voting 
system. The selected schemes are password 
hashed-based scheme, visual cryptography [8] 
as adopted from secret-balot receipts proposed 
by Chaum [9] and threshold decryption crypto-
system.
Steganography, which is a branch of informa-
tion security technique and has not been com-
monly used in E2E voting systems, is also in-
cluded in the software architecture design. It is 
the science of hiding information in commu-
nications, where no one other than the sender 
and receiver would know the existence of hid-
den information [10]. In 2007, Hong and Hong 
stated that steganography pays less atention to 
intentional atacks since it focuses more on data 
insertion capability [11]. However, as informa-
tion technology evolved and more threats arose, 
it became necessary to develop more secure 
steganography algorithms. The advantage of 
steganography over cryptography is its ability 
to ofer a more advanced way of hiding a se-
cret. Therefore, steganography is used to secure 
the data communication in this research. This 
scheme provides secret communication acces-
sible by encoding a secret message to various 
types of cover data such as text, images, audio, 
video file format. Each covered data has multi-
ple methods to hide the secret message. Unlike 
cryptography, the output data of steganography 
(stego-object) would stil look the same as its 
input data. Thus, it would be dificult to identify 
and interpret the hidden secret in the stego-ob-
ject. For electronic voting system implemen-
tation, both image and text steganography are 
appropriate candidates. They have more redun-
dancy, which alows larger size data to be en-
coded into the cover file. Other than that, they 
are also unlikely to raise any suspicion because 
they are the most common data transmited be-
tween the voter and the server. However, image 
steganography ofers a beter encoding tech-
nique to be used as it can hide the secret mes-
sage by securely transfering a hidden secret in 
a digital image file [12] – [13]. Hence, the im-
plementation of image steganography is used in 
this work.
There are five diferent stages in the system 
design architecture, namely the registration 
stage, authentication stage, voting stage, taly-
ing stage, verification stage. The secret-balot 
receipts theorem introduced by David Chaum 
[9] is mainly a combination of cut and choose 
scheme together with a cryptography tech-
nique caled visual cryptography. This scheme 
is applied and modified in this work. Thus, vi-
sual cryptography wil be implemented in the 
voting stage and verification stage as part of 
secret-balot receipt implementation. Right af-
ter a vote is done, steganography wil be used 
throughout the system processes for data com-
munication purpose. In the talying stage, the 
threshold decryption cryptosystem wil be im-
plemented. The combined method is believed 
to be suficient to provide a secure, reliable and 
convenient voting system. Since the proposed 
tool is an electronic voting system, it is neces-
sary to assume that the voter would complete 
the voting process secretly. On a basic level, 
the E2E voting framework ofers confidence to 
for anyone. It was designed to ensure a clean 
election seting with balot secrecy and election 
integrity. Scantegrity I is a practical enhance-
ment for optical scan voting systems, which 
achieve increased election integrity through a 
novel use of confirmation codes printed on bal-
lots in invisible inks. The development of Prêt a 
Voter was initialy motivated by Chaum's work 
of implementing visual cryptography approach 
proposed by Naor and Shamir [18] in an elec-
tion in 2004 to ofer vote verifiability. It imple-
ments the same concept as Chaum's secret-bal-
lot receipt scheme to provide more accurate 
and faster talying process, to cut unnecessary 
election cost and to increase voter participation. 
Prêt à Voter ofers assurance from its election 
auditability. RIES is a voting system that im-
plements multiple types of technologies. RIES 
alows eligible voters to cast their votes in two 
distinct techniques – either by mail or electron-
icaly. Based on this key feature, RIES alows 
its users to independently verify the election 
result. They were used in actual governmental 
and organisational elections, two of which are 
used for elections in educational institutions. 
Al E2E voting systems were designed to fulfil 
two main objectives of E2E voting systems, to 
provide individual-verifiability (also known as 
voter-verifiability) and universal-verifiability. 
The four voting systems reviewed are equipped 
with both features. Ironicaly, the implementa-
tion of these features caused the initiation of 
some known atacks like randomization atack.
We have looked at some other works as wel. 
Santos, de Queiroz, Saraiva and Junior [19] 
analysed various processes of electronic voting 
and counting of votes, to beter understand the 
secrecy of the vote. Chondros, Zhang, Zach-
arias, Diamantopoulos, Maneas, Patsonakis, 
Delis, Kiayias and Roussopoulos [20] present 
the design, implementation, security analysis, 
and evaluation of D-DEMOS e-voting system. 
It is a distributed, privacy-preserving and end-
to-end verifiable voting system. Sultan, Barb-
huiya and Sarma [21] discussed an online vot-
ing scheme by using biometric and password 
based security that makes use of fuzzy extrac-
tor to provide biometric based authentication, 
while the secret password is used to provide 
password-based protection of the voter, along 
with pairing-based cryptography to provide 
the needed security. Tornos, Salazar and Piles 
[22] describe the implementation of a secure 
the voters in their voting process. This is im-
plemented by circulating the vote receipt of en-
coded voting done for verification. To bolster 
this confirmation procedure, E2E frameworks 
executed some form of secure announcement 
board where each of the encoded votes would 
be posted once the voters finished the voting 
procedure. To check their cast votes, they have 
to match the encoded value on their receipt 
against the values published on the announce-
ment board. However, the vote receipt cannot 
be utilised as a proof of vote purchasing or vote 
coercion since it is encoded. Accordingly, the 
E2E voting framework would secure the vo-
ter's protection and backs incoercibility that 
supports the trustworthiness and fairness of the 
election result.
To achieve the aims and objectives of this work, 
the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) 
was used to implement the eVote system, a se-
cure end-to-end verifiable electronic voting 
system. The primary SDLC method is known 
as the waterfal method. An improved version 
of this method, the iterative waterfal model has 
been used for the eVote system development as 
it alows system developers and designers to 
corect any mistakes made at any of the stages 
during the system development. The iterative 
waterfal model is divided into five distinct 
phases, namely requirement analysis, design, 
implementation, testing and maintenance. This 
paper is organised as folows. Section 2 is the 
related works, Section 3 is the software require-
ment analysis of the voting system, Section 4 
is the software design of the voting system, 
Section 5 is the implementation of the voting 
system, Section 6 is the user acceptance testing 
of the voting system, and Section 7 is the con-
clusion.
2. The Related Works
To beter understand the previous works, we 
studied four E2E voting systems, namely He-
lios open-source web-based voting system, 
Scantegrity I optical voting system, Prêt à 
Voter and RIES voting system to beter under-
stand the features of the online voting systems 
[1], [14] – [17].
Helios is an open-source web-based voting 
system that ofers verifiable online elections 
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plementation of two distinct schemes. They are 
cryptography and steganography. Both compo-
nents of information security are combined in 
a layer of data protection. In electronic voting, 
cryptography is a commonly used technique as 
it is a good defence against threats. However, 
steganography has not been used commonly 
as an additional layer of security in an online 
voting system. The combination of these two 
schemes is the novel approach proposed in this 
work, mainly implemented to secure the com-
munication between the user and the server. It 
is expected to produce an improved technique, 
which could meet the voter's demand and per-
form with a less performance cost in a secure 
manner.
To ensure the integrity of an election, many 
schemes have been implemented and proposed. 
In these schemes, cryptography is used to pro-
tect the data transmited between the voter and 
the server, to ensure that it would not be leaked 
to a third party. The cryptography techniques 
are also applied in each process in the system 
to ensure the authenticity of the voter, the origi-
nality of the balots cast and colected votes, the 
reliability of the talied votes and the privacy 
throughout the election. There are many cryp-
tography methods that can be applied, such as 
blind signature scheme, homomorphic encryp-
tion, oblivious signature scheme, bit commit-
ment scheme, Schnor identification scheme, 
mixed-net schemes, digital signature scheme, 
secure multi-party computation, cryptographic 
hash-function, etc. However, in this work, only 
a few selected schemes are used. These are ap-
plied in diferent voting stages to preserve the 
main characteristics of an electronic voting 
system. The selected schemes are password 
hashed-based scheme, visual cryptography [8] 
as adopted from secret-balot receipts proposed 
by Chaum [9] and threshold decryption crypto-
system.
Steganography, which is a branch of informa-
tion security technique and has not been com-
monly used in E2E voting systems, is also in-
cluded in the software architecture design. It is 
the science of hiding information in commu-
nications, where no one other than the sender 
and receiver would know the existence of hid-
den information [10]. In 2007, Hong and Hong 
stated that steganography pays less atention to 
intentional atacks since it focuses more on data 
insertion capability [11]. However, as informa-
tion technology evolved and more threats arose, 
it became necessary to develop more secure 
steganography algorithms. The advantage of 
steganography over cryptography is its ability 
to ofer a more advanced way of hiding a se-
cret. Therefore, steganography is used to secure 
the data communication in this research. This 
scheme provides secret communication acces-
sible by encoding a secret message to various 
types of cover data such as text, images, audio, 
video file format. Each covered data has multi-
ple methods to hide the secret message. Unlike 
cryptography, the output data of steganography 
(stego-object) would stil look the same as its 
input data. Thus, it would be dificult to identify 
and interpret the hidden secret in the stego-ob-
ject. For electronic voting system implemen-
tation, both image and text steganography are 
appropriate candidates. They have more redun-
dancy, which alows larger size data to be en-
coded into the cover file. Other than that, they 
are also unlikely to raise any suspicion because 
they are the most common data transmited be-
tween the voter and the server. However, image 
steganography ofers a beter encoding tech-
nique to be used as it can hide the secret mes-
sage by securely transfering a hidden secret in 
a digital image file [12] – [13]. Hence, the im-
plementation of image steganography is used in 
this work.
There are five diferent stages in the system 
design architecture, namely the registration 
stage, authentication stage, voting stage, taly-
ing stage, verification stage. The secret-balot 
receipts theorem introduced by David Chaum 
[9] is mainly a combination of cut and choose 
scheme together with a cryptography tech-
nique caled visual cryptography. This scheme 
is applied and modified in this work. Thus, vi-
sual cryptography wil be implemented in the 
voting stage and verification stage as part of 
secret-balot receipt implementation. Right af-
ter a vote is done, steganography wil be used 
throughout the system processes for data com-
munication purpose. In the talying stage, the 
threshold decryption cryptosystem wil be im-
plemented. The combined method is believed 
to be suficient to provide a secure, reliable and 
convenient voting system. Since the proposed 
tool is an electronic voting system, it is neces-
sary to assume that the voter would complete 
the voting process secretly. On a basic level, 
the E2E voting framework ofers confidence to 
for anyone. It was designed to ensure a clean 
election seting with balot secrecy and election 
integrity. Scantegrity I is a practical enhance-
ment for optical scan voting systems, which 
achieve increased election integrity through a 
novel use of confirmation codes printed on bal-
lots in invisible inks. The development of Prêt a 
Voter was initialy motivated by Chaum's work 
of implementing visual cryptography approach 
proposed by Naor and Shamir [18] in an elec-
tion in 2004 to ofer vote verifiability. It imple-
ments the same concept as Chaum's secret-bal-
lot receipt scheme to provide more accurate 
and faster talying process, to cut unnecessary 
election cost and to increase voter participation. 
Prêt à Voter ofers assurance from its election 
auditability. RIES is a voting system that im-
plements multiple types of technologies. RIES 
alows eligible voters to cast their votes in two 
distinct techniques – either by mail or electron-
icaly. Based on this key feature, RIES alows 
its users to independently verify the election 
result. They were used in actual governmental 
and organisational elections, two of which are 
used for elections in educational institutions. 
Al E2E voting systems were designed to fulfil 
two main objectives of E2E voting systems, to 
provide individual-verifiability (also known as 
voter-verifiability) and universal-verifiability. 
The four voting systems reviewed are equipped 
with both features. Ironicaly, the implementa-
tion of these features caused the initiation of 
some known atacks like randomization atack.
We have looked at some other works as wel. 
Santos, de Queiroz, Saraiva and Junior [19] 
analysed various processes of electronic voting 
and counting of votes, to beter understand the 
secrecy of the vote. Chondros, Zhang, Zach-
arias, Diamantopoulos, Maneas, Patsonakis, 
Delis, Kiayias and Roussopoulos [20] present 
the design, implementation, security analysis, 
and evaluation of D-DEMOS e-voting system. 
It is a distributed, privacy-preserving and end-
to-end verifiable voting system. Sultan, Barb-
huiya and Sarma [21] discussed an online vot-
ing scheme by using biometric and password 
based security that makes use of fuzzy extrac-
tor to provide biometric based authentication, 
while the secret password is used to provide 
password-based protection of the voter, along 
with pairing-based cryptography to provide 
the needed security. Tornos, Salazar and Piles 
[22] describe the implementation of a secure 
the voters in their voting process. This is im-
plemented by circulating the vote receipt of en-
coded voting done for verification. To bolster 
this confirmation procedure, E2E frameworks 
executed some form of secure announcement 
board where each of the encoded votes would 
be posted once the voters finished the voting 
procedure. To check their cast votes, they have 
to match the encoded value on their receipt 
against the values published on the announce-
ment board. However, the vote receipt cannot 
be utilised as a proof of vote purchasing or vote 
coercion since it is encoded. Accordingly, the 
E2E voting framework would secure the vo-
ter's protection and backs incoercibility that 
supports the trustworthiness and fairness of the 
election result.
To achieve the aims and objectives of this work, 
the Software Development Life Cycle (SDLC) 
was used to implement the eVote system, a se-
cure end-to-end verifiable electronic voting 
system. The primary SDLC method is known 
as the waterfal method. An improved version 
of this method, the iterative waterfal model has 
been used for the eVote system development as 
it alows system developers and designers to 
corect any mistakes made at any of the stages 
during the system development. The iterative 
waterfal model is divided into five distinct 
phases, namely requirement analysis, design, 
implementation, testing and maintenance. This 
paper is organised as folows. Section 2 is the 
related works, Section 3 is the software require-
ment analysis of the voting system, Section 4 
is the software design of the voting system, 
Section 5 is the implementation of the voting 
system, Section 6 is the user acceptance testing 
of the voting system, and Section 7 is the con-
clusion.
2. The Related Works
To beter understand the previous works, we 
studied four E2E voting systems, namely He-
lios open-source web-based voting system, 
Scantegrity I optical voting system, Prêt à 
Voter and RIES voting system to beter under-
stand the features of the online voting systems 
[1], [14] – [17].
Helios is an open-source web-based voting 
system that ofers verifiable online elections 
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eVoting system, based on ring signatures pro-
viding multiple features such as linkability or 
anonymity. Yi, Wang, and Ma [23] proposed a 
security sequencing protocol based on homo-
morphic encryption as secure multipart compu-
tation is becoming more and more popular in 
anonymous voting and online auction. Naidu 
and Kharat [24] discussed a secure authentica-
tion based on biometric features that use visual 
cryptography to provide confidentiality to the 
biometric database. It also uses the hash of a 
number to embed into image shares using cryp-
tography and steganography.
3. Software Requirement Analysis of 
the Voting System
A system has certain requirements that need to 
be satisfied for it to be able to function properly. 
The eVote as a remote E2E voting system not 
only ofers secure and reliable voting system, 
but it also provides a flexible platform for the 
election oficials to set up and maintain based 
on their needs. The system users are divided 
into three distinct types (levels) as folows, 
based on the user access rights.
3.1. Voters
In every electoral system, may it be traditional 
or electronic, the voters are one of its primary 
users. They are the main motive behind elec-
tronic voting system's development. The voters 
expect and request a secure system that is time 
eficient and easy to use. With the evolution 
of information technology, it is possible to de-
velop such a system.
3.2. Poling Oficers
Adopted from the traditional voting system's 
procedure, poling oficers are needed in ki-
osk electronic voting system or in any voting 
system that provides voting at poling booths 
(stations). The remote electronic voting system 
normaly does not require assistance from the 
poling oficers. The electronic voting systems 
can add another layer of security where poling 
oficers are employed for protection from pos-
sible threats.
3.3. System Administrators
Every system is required to have system admin-
istrators to manage and maintain the system. 
This is true in electronic voting systems as wel. 
In eVote, the administrators can set up an elec-
tion, add eligible voters and oficers, edit the 
details of registered voters and registered ofi-
cers, assign diferent voters to their respective 
poling oficers, etc. Even with the highest level 
of access, it is not possible for the eVote's sys-
tem administrators to cheat or to execute some 
known atacks on the electronic voting system. 
The eVote is an improved version of the exist-
ing end-to-end verifiable voting system. The 
various features supported by eVote are subject 
to the user type, with the system administra-
tors as the highest user level. The functional 
requirements are a set of tasks or functions the 
system is required to perform like in any voting 
system. It summarises the intended behaviour 
of the system. The eVote's non-functional re-
quirements consist of its security, usability, 
performance and reliability. The functional re-
quirements of the eVote system include system 
authorization, system authentication, applied 
technologies, system documentation, its data 
type and data handling. The non-functional re-
quirements are a set of tasks or functions that 
shal be performed by the system. It sums up 
the whole operations of the system.
Some of the user requirements gathered in the 
requirements phase of the online voting soft-
ware development are as folows: mobility and 
convenience, completeness (where al valid 
votes are counted corectly), eligibility and un
-reusability (where no voter can vote twice), 
privacy, soundness (where a dishonest voter 
cannot disrupt the voting), verifiability (where 
no one can falsify the result of voting) and ro-
bustness (where the result reflects al submited 
and wel-formed balots corectly), incoerc-
ibility (where only the voters can acquire any 
information regarding their secret balots) and 
receipt-freeness (where each voter can neither 
obtain nor be able to construct a receipt) and 
fairness. We wil show how these were ad-
dressed at the end of this paper. The screenshot 
of poling oficer's homepage is shown in Fig-
ure 1.
4. Software Design of the 
Voting System
The software design of the eVote system is di-
vided into few parts like system integration and 
use case diagrams. System integration elabo-
rates the overal integration between the com-
ponents of the eVote voting system. It is de-
scribed in more detail in the graphical notation 
of the models. They are discussed as folows.
One of the requirements that eVote must meet 
is mobility requirement. To fulfil this require-
ment, the eVote voting system must be built as 
a web application. Hence, the votes can be cast 
from anywhere the users prefer, provided stable 
Internet connection is available.
Due to its low platform dependency as wel as 
other characteristics such as security, robust-
ness and scalability, Java EE 6 has been cho-
sen as the main platform of the eVote's system 
architecture. Java EE infrastructure is a set of 
specifications implemented by diferent con-
tainers [25]. The containers themselves are Java 
EE runtime environments that support a set of 
Application Programming Interface (API) and 
provide various services to their hosted com-
ponents. The web container ofers services for 
managing and executing web components. In 
this work, they are the modules of the eVote 
system. Each module caries out a task that can 
include or extend other tasks the system per-
forms. In the use case diagram, the modules are 
represented as actions. The use case diagram 
could be used to conveniently document the 
system activities. It shows the roles of the eVote 
voting system and how the system implements 
those roles [26], as shown in Figure 2.
The web containers are also required to instan-
tiate, initialize and invoke servlets and support 
HTTP and HTTPS protocols [25]. EJB con-
tainer, on the other hand, manages and executes 
enterprise beans that contain the eVote's busi-
ness logic. It creates and manages the instances 
of EJBs and JPAs and provides a number of 
services for eVote, such as distributed transac-
tion between network hosts, security, database 
access, naming and directory service [25]. Its 
integration with the client machine, Java appli-
cation server and the database server are shown 
in Figure 3.
5. Implementation of the Voting 
System
The eVote system implementation is done as 
two versions based on the diferent Java plat-
forms used for the implementation, and the two 
versions are eVote v1.0 and eVote v2.0. They 
are described as folows. The eVote v1.0 is not 
equipped with registration, authentication, tal-
lying and publishing stages. It was mainly de-
veloped to examine the reliability of the imple-
mented primary security approaches used, i.e. 
image steganography and visual cryptography. 
Figure 1. Screenshot of poling oficer's homepage.
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viding multiple features such as linkability or 
anonymity. Yi, Wang, and Ma [23] proposed a 
security sequencing protocol based on homo-
morphic encryption as secure multipart compu-
tation is becoming more and more popular in 
anonymous voting and online auction. Naidu 
and Kharat [24] discussed a secure authentica-
tion based on biometric features that use visual 
cryptography to provide confidentiality to the 
biometric database. It also uses the hash of a 
number to embed into image shares using cryp-
tography and steganography.
3. Software Requirement Analysis of 
the Voting System
A system has certain requirements that need to 
be satisfied for it to be able to function properly. 
The eVote as a remote E2E voting system not 
only ofers secure and reliable voting system, 
but it also provides a flexible platform for the 
election oficials to set up and maintain based 
on their needs. The system users are divided 
into three distinct types (levels) as folows, 
based on the user access rights.
3.1. Voters
In every electoral system, may it be traditional 
or electronic, the voters are one of its primary 
users. They are the main motive behind elec-
tronic voting system's development. The voters 
expect and request a secure system that is time 
eficient and easy to use. With the evolution 
of information technology, it is possible to de-
velop such a system.
3.2. Poling Oficers
Adopted from the traditional voting system's 
procedure, poling oficers are needed in ki-
osk electronic voting system or in any voting 
system that provides voting at poling booths 
(stations). The remote electronic voting system 
normaly does not require assistance from the 
poling oficers. The electronic voting systems 
can add another layer of security where poling 
oficers are employed for protection from pos-
sible threats.
3.3. System Administrators
Every system is required to have system admin-
istrators to manage and maintain the system. 
This is true in electronic voting systems as wel. 
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details of registered voters and registered ofi-
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known atacks on the electronic voting system. 
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to the user type, with the system administra-
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dressed at the end of this paper. The screenshot 
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The software design of the eVote system is di-
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Due to its low platform dependency as wel as 
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EE runtime environments that support a set of 
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include or extend other tasks the system per-
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The web containers are also required to instan-
tiate, initialize and invoke servlets and support 
HTTP and HTTPS protocols [25]. EJB con-
tainer, on the other hand, manages and executes 
enterprise beans that contain the eVote's busi-
ness logic. It creates and manages the instances 
of EJBs and JPAs and provides a number of 
services for eVote, such as distributed transac-
tion between network hosts, security, database 
access, naming and directory service [25]. Its 
integration with the client machine, Java appli-
cation server and the database server are shown 
in Figure 3.
5. Implementation of the Voting 
System
The eVote system implementation is done as 
two versions based on the diferent Java plat-
forms used for the implementation, and the two 
versions are eVote v1.0 and eVote v2.0. They 
are described as folows. The eVote v1.0 is not 
equipped with registration, authentication, tal-
lying and publishing stages. It was mainly de-
veloped to examine the reliability of the imple-
mented primary security approaches used, i.e. 
image steganography and visual cryptography. 
Figure 1. Screenshot of poling oficer's homepage.
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The eVote v1.0 was developed using Java Stan-
dard Edition (SE) platform with no connection 
to the Database Server. However, eVote v2.0 is 
a complete voting system. In version 1, a few 
JFrame GUIs were implemented to perform 
the main components of the eVote's business 
process at a single user level to accommodate 
quality assurance of the selected security ap-
proaches. The voting stage is briefly described 
as folows. To secure the vote transmission be-
tween the client and server and to assure the 
user of the integrity of the votes, both F5 image 
steganography algorithm and visual cryptogra-
phy scheme are implemented in this stage. The 
system must create a compatible source image 
containing the balot for visual cryptography 
encryption by passing a secret message derived 
from the decrypted stego-image. Because of 
the visual cryptography encryption, half of the 
shares need to be obtained by the voters [27] – 
[28].
They are prompted to complete this task by sav-
ing their vote receipt into the folder they spec-
ify. The vote verification is ensured as folows. 
In a traditional paper-based voting, once the 
taly process is done, authorised personnel wil 
announce the result of the election. However, 
voters wil not be able to verify their votes. 
Thus, voters cannot be assured that their sub-
mited balot is counted as cast. This may afect 
the turnout in subsequent elections. To solve 
this problem, voter receipt is implemented in 
the system development of the E2E voting sys-
tem. This receipt is not revealed in their balots. 
It can be used by each voter to ensure that the 
balot cast is properly formed by the system. 
Each user can only obtain one share of the vi-
sual cryptography encrypted image. The other 
half of the shares is automaticaly saved in the 
database. The combined shares would be used 
to retrieve and verify the voters' balot. The vot-
ers in such a system can verify their votes by 
submiting the vote receipt sent to their email 
accounts. The verification feature is supported 
by the visual cryptography scheme. The vote 
receipt submited by the voters wil be matched 
(decrypted) against the other half of the encryp-
tion share saved in the database during the vot-
ing stage.
The result of this decryption mechanism is the 
voters' balot. In this way, most of remote elec-
tronic voting system's requirements, such as 
incoercibility, receipt-freeness, universal-veri-
fiability, etc. are ensured as neither the poling 
oficers nor the system administrator has ac-
cess to identifying the colected balots. Only 
the voters themselves have access to them. The 
eVote v2.0 is an enhanced version of eVote 
v1.0. The eVote v2.0 is developed based on the 
preliminary studies done in this work. It is de-
veloped using Java EE 6 framework. The sys-
tem is equipped with three types of user levels, 
i.e. voters, poling oficers and system admin-
istrators. The eVote v2.0 ofers ful implemen-
tation of the system with many features. The 
processes of vote verification in both versions 
of eVote are identical. However, the voting pro-
cess of eVote v.10 and v2.0 are diferent due to 
the implementation of the database. Further ex-
planation of the four stages of the eVote system 
is given as folows. They are the registration 
stage, authentication stage, voting stage and 
talying stage.
5.1. Registration Stage
This stage is also known as the preparation 
stage. In this stage, al constraints for the elec-
tion are prepared. The registration stage is com-
pleted by the voters and poling oficers. Before 
this stage, system administrators must prepare 
the election setup by inserting the details of 
the election and the candidate's details for each 
category in the election. Besides, the system 
administrators also need to add eligible voters' 
and poling oficers' records in the database. 
This record includes their usernames, Identifi-
cation Card (IC) numbers and their valid email 
addresses. Upon successful atempts, eligible 
users wil receive an email from the system ad-
ministrator notifying their eligibility to register 
into the eVote system. Only eligible users can 
cary out the voter's registration. By accessing 
the link provided in the email, eligible voters 
and oficers can now register themselves in the 
system. To register themselves in the system, 
users are required to provide their details and 
submit them to the system and ensure the ac-
curacy of the details given by the users. These 
are then matched with users' details saved by 
the administrators in the database. As another 
layer of security, users' passwords wil be cryp-
tographicaly secured by applying password 
hashed-based scheme. By the implementation 
of this cryptography technique, only the hashed 
password together with its salt value is saved 
into the database. Its implementation wil be 
explained further in the next stage of the eVote 
system, which is authentication stage. Figures 4 
and 5 show the registration process flow of the 
voters in two distinct sequence diagrams. There 
is a slight diference between voter and oficer 
registration processes. Each voter atempting 
to register in the system wil be randomly as-
signed to a poling oficer.
This is done as an additional layer of protec-
tion over the database records, which wil be 
described further in the talying stage. After the 
successful registration process, users wil be 
directed to their respective homepage by the 
system.
Figure 3. Integrated eVote system.
Figure 2. eVote's business processes in use case diagram.
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cess to identifying the colected balots. Only 
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eVote v2.0 is an enhanced version of eVote 
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veloped using Java EE 6 framework. The sys-
tem is equipped with three types of user levels, 
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tation of the system with many features. The 
processes of vote verification in both versions 
of eVote are identical. However, the voting pro-
cess of eVote v.10 and v2.0 are diferent due to 
the implementation of the database. Further ex-
planation of the four stages of the eVote system 
is given as folows. They are the registration 
stage, authentication stage, voting stage and 
talying stage.
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This stage is also known as the preparation 
stage. In this stage, al constraints for the elec-
tion are prepared. The registration stage is com-
pleted by the voters and poling oficers. Before 
this stage, system administrators must prepare 
the election setup by inserting the details of 
the election and the candidate's details for each 
category in the election. Besides, the system 
administrators also need to add eligible voters' 
and poling oficers' records in the database. 
This record includes their usernames, Identifi-
cation Card (IC) numbers and their valid email 
addresses. Upon successful atempts, eligible 
users wil receive an email from the system ad-
ministrator notifying their eligibility to register 
into the eVote system. Only eligible users can 
cary out the voter's registration. By accessing 
the link provided in the email, eligible voters 
and oficers can now register themselves in the 
system. To register themselves in the system, 
users are required to provide their details and 
submit them to the system and ensure the ac-
curacy of the details given by the users. These 
are then matched with users' details saved by 
the administrators in the database. As another 
layer of security, users' passwords wil be cryp-
tographicaly secured by applying password 
hashed-based scheme. By the implementation 
of this cryptography technique, only the hashed 
password together with its salt value is saved 
into the database. Its implementation wil be 
explained further in the next stage of the eVote 
system, which is authentication stage. Figures 4 
and 5 show the registration process flow of the 
voters in two distinct sequence diagrams. There 
is a slight diference between voter and oficer 
registration processes. Each voter atempting 
to register in the system wil be randomly as-
signed to a poling oficer.
This is done as an additional layer of protec-
tion over the database records, which wil be 
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directed to their respective homepage by the 
system.
Figure 3. Integrated eVote system.
Figure 2. eVote's business processes in use case diagram.
L. Rura et al. Online Voting System based on Image Steganography and Visual Cryptography54 55
5.2. Authentication Stage
In a remote electronic voting system, the imple-
mentation of this stage is mandatory. The ob-
jective of this stage is to ensure voters' identity. 
Registered voters are authenticated by logging 
into the system. They wil be prompted to en-
ter their self-defined usernames and encrypted 
passwords for security purpose. As mentioned 
in the previous stage, users' passwords are not 
saved in the database. Only their hashed and 
salt values are saved. It is because Hashed-
based Algorithms are one-way functions. They 
cannot be converted back to a plain text. To 
authenticate users, administrators are required 
to compare the ciphertext from user input with 
the ciphertext stored in the database. Figure 6 
elaborates the process of user authentication in 
a format of the sequence diagram. Once a user 
has been identified as a registered voter and has 
successfuly logged into the system, he wil see 
a welcome screen, which states the user account 
status and a menu panel where a user can navi-
gate through features ofered, depending on the 
user level.
5.3. Voting Stage
This stage can only be completed by the voters. 
They are the only type of users who are eligible 
to cast the votes. In some of the E2E system, 
this stage is caried out by marking their cho-
sen candidate(s) on the paper balot, and then 
it needs to be scanned with the optical scanner 
or by using DRE machine to be submited for 
the taly process. However, in eVote, this stage 
is caried out by forming a secured balot elec-
tronicaly and sending it to the election server 
where al the balots would be colected and 
stored.
After completing the two stages mentioned 
above, voters can log on to the system and ac-
cess the voting page. They can cast their votes 
by selecting their desired candidates for each 
category listed on that page. Besides that, the 
users could also review, reset and reselect can-
didates before they submit their votes. The 
voter's balot is generated every time the cho-
sen candidates are reviewed. During the balot 
generation, F5 image steganography algorithm 
would be applied [29]. The F5 algorithm is im-
plemented to secure data communication be-
tween the voter and the election server, even 
before the balot is cast. The voter's chosen can-
didates would be encrypted in a stego-image 
format as a camouflage for their balot.
The atackers would not have any idea that the 
client is sending their balot to the server in a 
jpeg file format image. This balot wil, later on, 
be sent over to the taly server. Once received 
by the server, the balot package would be de-
crypted to reveal the candidate names hidden 
on the balot before being encrypted again with 
visual cryptography as an additional security 
level to earn voter's direct trust by providing 
vote receipt. This ensures that voters' votes 
have been colected as cast.
The decrypted stego-image (balot) would be 
encrypted using a visual cryptography tech-
nique by spliting the vote into a number of 
shares. In this system, the shares would be lim-
ited to two. The stand-alone share would not 
reveal any information to anyone, but once the 
shares are overlaid (combined) using a visual 
cryptography decryption algorithm, the voter's 
casted vote value would be revealed. Basicaly, 
each voter would be given one layer (share) of 
the image as the receipt which wil be sent to 
the respective email account, while the other 
separated layer of the vote would be kept or 
saved by the administrator for balot count-
ing purposes as wel as to hide the relation of 
each voter with the balot. Therefore, the voters 
would stil be able to verify their votes and wil 
have a beter trust and confidence in the system. 
In the eVote system, the voting stage process 
is finished when the voting summary page is 
shown. 
5.4. Talying Stage
The talying stage folows the voting stage. Af-
ter the votes are cast, the balot is securely stored 
in the database. Users cannot access the balots 
before the completion of the talying stage. 
The taly determined at this stage is obtained 
by poling oficers with the help from system 
administrators. Each poling oficer holds a 
unique secret key to retrieve balot records from 
the database. These keys are pre-distributed by 
the system administrators during the election 
setup. The system administrators generate these 
keys by utilising UUID. Figure 7 elaborates this 
process in a sequence diagram. To access the 
taly list, poling oficers must perform the 'de-
Figure 5. Sequence diagram of addEligibleVoter() function.
Figure 4. Sequence diagram of voter registration process.
Figure 6. Sequence diagram of user authentication process.
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cryption' process by merging their secret keys. 
This method is caled the threshold decryption 
cryptosystem [30]. Only after each of the pol-
ing oficers has submited their secret keys, the 
taly result list (buletin board) is accessible to 
the system administrators and the poling ofi-
cers for monitoring. This taly list is only read-
able and does not show any relation between 
the balot and its voter. Threshold scheme is 
implemented in the balots decryption process 
to ensure that only the authorised personnel can 
count the votes.
6. User Acceptance Testing of the 
Voting System
The users' acceptance was measured by using 
Davis' Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). 
For the questionnaire survey, 15 representa-
tive individuals from diferent demographic 
groups participated. They were recruited based 
on the consideration of few significant aspects 
such as gender, the level of education and ba-
sic knowledge of information security and us-
ability knowledge. The users were also chosen 
based on the minimum voting age requirement 
by the Malaysian law. Each of the participants 
was required to complete a set of voter's tasks 
assigned to them and to fil in a questionnaire in 
not more than thirty minutes. This test was con-
ducted to consider not only technical factors to 
support the system's performance, but also to 
consider the behavioural factors of the users. To 
understand user acceptance level of the system, 
the Technology Acceptance Model [31] was 
used in this work. Such a model can provide 
a robust indication of the eVote's user accep-
tance. Davis claimed that these are two distinct 
cognitive appraisals of users' atitudes. They are 
the design features and the afective response to 
the system. In this test, two types of the design 
features proposed by Davis were applied to ex-
amine the user acceptance level. Those design 
features include perceived usefulness (extrinsic 
motivator) and perceived ease of use (intrinsic 
motivator). Perceived usefulness is the degree 
to which an individual believes that a system 
would enhance his or her job performance. On 
the other hand, perceived ease of use is the de-
gree to which a user believes that the use of a 
system would require less efort compared with 
another system. Figure 8 shows the result col-
lected based on the evaluation of perceiving the 
ease of use. Based on the evaluation conducted, 
the eVote's perceived usefulness aspect is 
shown in Figure 8. The 15 participants mostly 
prefered to cast their votes by using a remote 
E2E voting system, compared to casting their 
votes in the poling booth in a traditional vot-
ing system. As per the participants, the imple-
mentation of vote receipt is more reliable and 
ofers more assurance to them, compared to the 
implementation of indelible ink used in the tra-
ditional voting system. There are many ways 
counterfeit votes can be cast using indelible ink 
due to the involvement of many parties in its 
implementation. However, the implementation 
of vote receipt only requires the involvement of 
system administrators and poling oficers who 
are assumed trustworthy. Thus, it can be noted 
that the perceived ease of use afects the out-
come of the usefulness evaluation.  Perceived 
usefulness itself is the core factor of user accep-
tance level over the system.
From the result displayed in Figure 9, the result 
of the eVote's perceived usefulness aspect was 
expected. The user acceptance level could also 
be identified by evaluating the user require-
ments gathered in the requirements phase of the 
software development. Each requirement was 
grouped based on their characteristics and anal-
ysed as folows.
6.1. Mobility and Convenience
This is one of the aspects that an E2E system 
could not provide. Many of them used one or 
more election technologies that forced the users 
Figure 7. Sequence diagram of secret keys distribution process by the system administrator. Figure 8. The eVote perceived ease of use evaluation.
Figure 9. The eVote perceived usefulness evaluation.
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lected based on the evaluation of perceiving the 
ease of use. Based on the evaluation conducted, 
the eVote's perceived usefulness aspect is 
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prefered to cast their votes by using a remote 
E2E voting system, compared to casting their 
votes in the poling booth in a traditional vot-
ing system. As per the participants, the imple-
mentation of vote receipt is more reliable and 
ofers more assurance to them, compared to the 
implementation of indelible ink used in the tra-
ditional voting system. There are many ways 
counterfeit votes can be cast using indelible ink 
due to the involvement of many parties in its 
implementation. However, the implementation 
of vote receipt only requires the involvement of 
system administrators and poling oficers who 
are assumed trustworthy. Thus, it can be noted 
that the perceived ease of use afects the out-
come of the usefulness evaluation.  Perceived 
usefulness itself is the core factor of user accep-
tance level over the system.
From the result displayed in Figure 9, the result 
of the eVote's perceived usefulness aspect was 
expected. The user acceptance level could also 
be identified by evaluating the user require-
ments gathered in the requirements phase of the 
software development. Each requirement was 
grouped based on their characteristics and anal-
ysed as folows.
6.1. Mobility and Convenience
This is one of the aspects that an E2E system 
could not provide. Many of them used one or 
more election technologies that forced the users 
Figure 7. Sequence diagram of secret keys distribution process by the system administrator. Figure 8. The eVote perceived ease of use evaluation.
Figure 9. The eVote perceived usefulness evaluation.
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to vote in a particular venue. The eVote ofers 
a secure remote electronic voting system with 
vote verification feature which alows voters to 
vote anytime and anywhere, provided their PC 
is connected to the Internet.
6.2. Completeness
In a traditional voting, this requirement is sim-
ply catered by comparing the number of voters 
and the counted votes. This is merely time-con-
suming, and the chances of human-erors are 
high. On the other hand, the E2E online voting 
system could complete this task within seconds. 
The poling oficers and system administrators 
are responsible for monitoring the balots and 
the overal talying process, including the taly 
result. However, vote coercion can stil occur. 
The eVote voting system reduces this by elimi-
nating direct access to the database without the 
consent of multiple parties. The users can only 
access the database server from the system. It 
ensures that the completeness of eVote voting 
system would not be violated.
6.3. Privacy, Soundness, Verifiability and 
Robustness
The deliverance of these aspects is ensured in 
the eVote voting system's design by implement-
ing image steganography. The vote transmis-
sion during voting process in eVote is secured 
beforehand by encoding the cast balot with F5 
image steganography algorithm. As the privacy 
of the votes could be guaranteed, the soundness 
and verifiability could be caried out as wel be-
cause no one can obtain any information on the 
votes except the voters themselves.
6.4. Incoercibility and Receipt-freeness
As visual cryptography receipt is included in 
eVote's system architecture, these two require-
ments are supported. It is used in conjunction 
with visual cryptography to ensure the integrity 
of the election and to prevent improper influ-
ence in the election process. The receipt is se-
cure and in the format of visual cryptography 
image share. Untrustworthy voters are not able 
to prove to a coercer that they have voted in a 
particular way. Thus, incoercibility and receipt-
freeness are supported in the eVote system.
6.5. Fairness
In the talying stage, the threshold decryption 
scheme was applied to keep the vote secure. 
The read-only taly result is only accessible to 
poling oficers and system administrators after 
the election has ended. The distributed secret 
receipts should be submited by al the poling 
oficers to the election server. Because of this, 
no one can gain any information regarding the 
taly result before the election ends.
A comparison of the E2E voting system com-
ponents is given in Table 1 for diferent online 
voting systems. The eVote is comparable to 
many of them and beter in some features.
7. Conclusion
As we know, voting systems are classified 
into two types based on their balot mecha-
nism, namely paper-based E2E voting systems 
and electronic E2E voting systems. As a re-
ceipt-based voting system, both voting systems 
alow their voters to verify the accuracy of their 
votes to ensure that they have been colected 
as cast and counted as colected by using the 
vote receipt. Thus, incoercibility is ofered in 
such voting systems. This however, creates 
other vulnerabilities in the paper-based E2E 
voting system. They are caused by the depen-
dency on a few aspects, for example, possible 
erors made from the integration of the voting 
system with an additional external hardware 
(e.g. DRE machine) and human erors during 
the vote tabulation. On the other hand, even 
though the implementation of vote receipt in 
the electronic E2E voting systems eliminates 
this problem, the vote receipt feature ofered 
must be practical and convenient. It must meet 
the basic user-requirements, on top of the se-
curity requirements. However, these aspects are 
sometimes overlooked. These issues have been 
addressed in the eVote voting system devel-
opment. The eVote is developed based on the 
password hashed-based scheme, visual cryp-
tography as adopted from secret-balot receipt 
scheme, threshold decryption cryptosystem and 
F5 image steganography for security, which do 
not have high computational cost.
The contribution of this paper lies in the sim-
plicity and user-friendliness it ofers without 
compromising the system security and usabil-
ity. The vote receipt in eVote was implemented 
in visual cryptography image format. This type 
of vote receipt format is more practical and 
convenient than the vote receipt in ciphertext 
format. The solution has no efect on the sys-
tem security. This system has been designed 
and developed to provide a more secure voting 
system compared to other E2E verifiable voting 
systems. The system is also scalable if a high 
end and security hardened election server is 
instaled in a more professional environment. 
Then it can be used for large-scale elections. 
Though we do not claim that the system is fuly 
secure against al forms of atacks, it can pro-
vide a reasonably secure environment for on-
line voting.
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